Court in Luxemburg has decided about the establishment of limitation periods for some public procurement procedures, that the defi nition of the conditions in which these limitation periods operate is subject of the legal system of the Member States and is, in principle, in subject to the requirement of the application of the principle of legal certainty. 6 Also by the same token, in relation to the establishment of legal requirements for the admission into the profession of lawyer which cannot discriminate against people already retired on the age criterion or who have less than 5 years until retirement age, 'the Court of Justice of the European communities, by the Decision of 22 November 2005, given in the case W. Mangold v R. Helm, 7 regarding the establishment of an age criterion in the matter of conclusion of employment contracts, has decided that a [...] legislation which retains the age of the worker as sole criterion for the application of a fi xed-term employment contract, without having demonstrated that the establishment of an age threshold [...] is objectively necessary to achieve an employability objective [...], must be considered as outside the appropriate and necessary framework to attain the envisaged objective' . the provisions of the international documents mentioned. '
9 Th e error is rightfully considered in doctrine to be 'inadmissible' , 10 the provisions of Art.148 of the Constitution referring exclusively to European Union law. Surprisingly enough, the same error was repeated even worse, aft er the accession, in the text of a decision from 2007.
11 Th e Constitutional Court established by Decision No. 588 of 19 June 2007, that 'this kind of Community acts 12 represent legal measures which allow the institutions of the European Union to present their points of view to the Member States, without the obligation of the Member States to comply with the decision made by the Community administration. Recommendations, as opposed to opinions, can be made on its own initiative, thus representing only the position of the issuing institution, their real meaning being of a moral or political nature. ' 13 Th e number of judgments of the Court of Justice of the European Union and of the Court of European Union invoked in the statement of reasons of the Constitutional Court of Romania was a small one (only 62 until 31 December 2014 out of a total number of 10207 decisions, judgements and opinions adopted in the period [2007] [2008] [2009] [2010] [2011] [2012] [2013] [2014] 14 ) , irrespective of the way in which they were used. More recently, without any mention of the name of the cases, the Constitutional Court of Romania makes reference to the case law of the CJEU, 'which reminded the importance which the principle of the matter already judged both within the legal system of the Union, and within the national legal systems (Judgement of 29 June 2010 passed in the case C-526/08, 30 par. 26). Th is principle is the expression of the principle of legal security (judgement of 1 June 1999, passed in the case C-126/97, 31 par. 46). Th us, in order to guarantee both the stability of the law and of the legal relations, and a good administration of justice, it is necessary that the judgements which are fi nal aft er the exhaustion of all available remedies or aft er the expiry of the deadlines for these legal procedures, should not be contested (judgement of 3 September 2009 passed in the case C-2/08, 32 par. 22). ' 40 as 'in the relations between the Community and the national law (with the exception of the Constitution), one can speak only of the priority of application of the former over the latter, which is within the power of the courts of law' . national law only if it is implicitly or explicitly contrary to any constitutional text' .
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Constitutional identity and respectively national identity are not notions further analysed by the Constitutional Court of Romania. A general reference mentions the fact that 'each Member State, by virtue of the principle of national constitutional identity, has full freedom to establish the legislative framework relating to the statute of the members of Parliament who activate in the national legislative forum, including the legal regime of the property rights related to the exercise of these publicly appointed offi ces' . 46 At the same time, citing the Bundesverfassungsgericht of Germany (Decision of 30 June 2009 on the Lisbon Treaty), the Constitutional Court of Romania seems to develop the notion of 'national constitutional identity' , showing that 'member states maintain powers which are inherent to keeping their constitutional identity, as giving up powers, as well as reconsidering, accentuating and stressing new guidelines within the powers already given up, is up to the constitutional area of assessment of the Member States' . 47 Even so, as a principle, constitutional provisions off er at most a hint to the notion of national identity, for each Member State. and on the other hand it should be circumscribed by a certain level of constitutional relevance, so that its normative content could support the possible breach of the Constitution -the only direct standard norm within the constitutionality control -by the national law. In such a hypothesis, the approach of the Constitutional Court is diff erent than the mere application and interpretation of the law, which is a power of the courts of law and of the administrative authorities, or than the possible matters which are part of the legal policy promoted by the Parliament or the Government, as the case may be. By virtue of the cumulative conditionality stated above, it is up to the Constitutional Court to apply within the constitutionality control the decisions of the Court of Justice of the European Union or to ask itself preliminary questions in order to establish the content of the European law. Such approach is part of the national and European institutional cooperation, as well as of the judicial dialogue between them, without bringing into discussion aspects which have to do with establishing hierarchies between these jurisdictions. In this case, even though the meaning of the European law was decoded by the Court of Justice of the European Union, the requirements resulting from this decision do not have constitutional relevance, having to do more with the obligation of the lawmaker to pass laws in keeping with the decisions and supplementing some legal acts, and other budget and tax measures, publishes in the Offi cial Gazette, Part I, No. 93 of 4 February 2015, adopted in a case in which in parallel reference for a preliminary ruling to the Court of Justice of the European Union, case C-288/14, Ciup, has been made, a case which is still open. Th is is the preliminary question: 'Can the principle of equivalence and eff ectiveness of remedies in relation to infringements of the European Union law, set out in the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union, as well as the right to property, set out by the Art. 17 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, be interpreted as contravening some provisions of the internal law which postpone, by a staging of 5 years, the refund of the taxes levied as an infringement of the Community Law, and of the respective interest, decided by an enforceable judgement until 31 December 2015?' . 50 Considered to be a 'condition of cognoscibility by which the constitutional court, to ensure the observation of the principle of separation of powers, declares itself competent to enforce the interposed norms within the constitutional law, only if these do not pose diffi culties as to their meaning. Moreover, it was decided that 'taking into consideration the place occupied by the Community regulations, according to Art. 148 par. (2) of the Constitution, in relation to the internal laws, the Constitutional Court is called to invoke in its case law the obligatory acts of the European Union whenever they are relevant to the cause, as long as their content is clear and no specifi c interpretation is necessary. '
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Th is has happened several times, including in the case law solutions with reference to the Cooperation and Verifi cation Mechanism of the progress made by Romania with a view to attaining certain specifi c reference objectives in the fi eld of reform of the judicial system and of the fi ght against corruption, the obligatory European legislation being a particularly important indicator for the Constitutional Court Doctrine however considered it was about an 'act of reception sui generis, taking over through a specifi c source -the constitutional provision -certain norms of the European law' , and 'any norm of the European law which has the quality to produce direct eff ect will automatically fulfi l the fi rst requirement as well, in order to be able to function as an interposed norm. As far as the other requirement is concerned, the criterion which has to be met allows the Court to opt, arbitrarily, either for the application in concreto of the interposed norm, of for ignoring it, turning the obligation imposed by Art. 148 par. (4) Th e Constitutional Court of Romania has retained 'that the norm meets the requirements of clarity and precision. Th us it unequivocally establishes the fi eld of application -the matter of state aid, the legal entity which it addresses -the Member State of the European Union, the obligation incumbent on it -informing in due time the European Commission on the lawmaking project which envisage the institution or the amendment of the legal framework on state aid, as well as the consequence of the failure to comply with the obligation stipulated by the Treaty -dismantling or amending the aid by the respective Member State within the time established by the Commission, and the referral to the Court of Justice of the European Union with a complaint against the respective Member State. '
Regarding the second condition (the norm should be circumscribed by a certain level of constitutional relevance, so that its normative content could support the possible breach of the Constitution -the only direct standard norm within the constitutionality control -by national law) the Constitutional Court has found that 'this exigence is not met by the norm of European law […] . 66 . Th e provisions of the Art. 108 par. (3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union constitute procedural norms applicable in the matter of competition within the internal market, respectively in the fi eld of state aid. According to Art. 107 par. (1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, any aid granted by a Member State or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods and aff ects trade between Member States is incompatible with the common market. In order to prevent or remove any measures which could aff ect free competition within the internal market, according to Art. 108 par. (1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, the Commission, together with the Member States, permanently checks the legal frameworks of the existing aids in these states. Th e Commission suggests them the useful measures required by the gradual development or the functioning of the internal market. Th e activity of monitoring the national measures adopted in the fi eld of state aid is performed according to the procedure laid down in the Art. 108 (2) and (3) Within such a procedure, characterised by transparency and legal certainty, the rights of the interested parties and best protected, the examination end with a decision by the Commission, adopted on the basis of the available information, and, in the event of noncompliance with suspension or recovery injunctions, the Commission can refer the matter to the Court of Justice directly, in accordance with Art. 93 par. (2) the second paragraph of the Treaty (now Art. 113 of TFEU). '
As a result, the conclusion has been drawn that 'in the case, even if the meaning of the European law is clear and predictable, the requirements resulting from the interpretation and application of Art. 108 par. (3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, as they have been developed by the secondary legislation adopted on the basis of the Treaty, do not have constitutional relevance, as they regulate only the obligation of the Romanian lawmaker, the Parliament or the Government, as the case may be, to adopt measures in the fi eld of state aid, in compliance with the procedures stipulated by the European law. Th e noncompliance with the obligations assumed by the Treaty will have exclusively the legal consequences established by the European laws, namely dismantling or amending the aid within the time established by the Commission, in the case in which it establishes the incompatibility of the measures with the internal market, and respectively the referral to the Court of Justice of the European Union with a complaint against Romania, if the latter refuses to comply with a decision by 61 Th e Constitutional Court of Romania has shown that, when adopting the Regulation, the circumstance was taken into consideration, that in the cases in which, following the preliminary examination, the Commission cannot decide whether the aid is compatible with the internal market, an offi cial investigation procedure must be opened, in order to enable them to obtain all the necessary information for the assessment of the aid compatibility and to allow the interested parties to present their observations. Th us, the Regulation 70 and the transposition in the internal law of a secondary regulation of the European Union, namely a directive, 'an obligatory act which establishes for the Member States an obligation to achieve a certain result regarding the transposition, which however does not prevent the national lawmaker to make more ample, rigorous or detailed regulations in the envisaged fi eld. Th e national lawmaker however has the obligation to carry out this operation in a correct manner, in accordance with the objective and the spirit of the transposed European directive, which in this case, envisages more effi cient consumer protection' . unconstitutional to the extent to which they are interpreted in the sense that the decisions which remain fi nal and irrevocable cannot be revised, with the breach of the principle of priority of the European Union law, when it does not refer to the substance of the case. Th ese provisions, in terms of regulating the reason to revise referring to the infringement of the European Union law by an irrevocable judgment, refl ect the very obligation assumed by the authorities of the Romanian state, including the judicial one, to guarantee the fulfi lment of the obligations resulting from the accession act and the application of the principle of priority of the European Union law. Th e lack of such a reason to revise would amount to the denial of the legal force of the decisions of the Court of Justice of the European Union over the courts in the Member States, would deprive the litigants of the obligatory eff ects of these decisions and would mean the breach of the principle of the application with priority of the European Union law. By virtue of its quality of Member State of the European Union, Romania has the obligation to make available to the courts, and implicitly to the litigants, an effi cient legal instrument which should ensure the application of the European Union laws, as they have precedence over the contrary provisions of the internal laws. ' Maybe for this reason as well, the number of the Decisions of the Court of Justice of the European Union and of the Court of European Union invoked in the statement of reasons of the Constitutional Court of Romania was a small one (only 56 until 31 December 2014), irrespective of the way in which they were used: as justifying or circumstantial argument, as a mere reference or in an inadequate context. Th e Constitutional Court has subjected the introduction of a norm of European law into the constitutionality control, as an interposed norm to the standard norm, to the fact that the norm should be suffi ciently clear, precise and unequivocal in itself, or that its meaning should have been clearly, precisely and unequivocally established by the Court of Justice of the European Union, and to the fact that it should be circumscribed by a certain level of constitutional relevance, so that its normative content could support the possible breach of the Constitution -the only direct standard norm within the constitutionality control -by the national law. 
